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Abstract Many definitions of life have been put forward in the course of time, but none have emerged to entirely 
encapsulate life. Putting forward an adequate definition is not a simple matter to do, despite many people seeming to 
believe they have an intuitive understanding of what is meant when it is stated that something is life. However, it is 
important to define life, because we ourselves, individually and collectively, are life, which entails an importance in 
itself. Furthermore, humankind‘s capability to look for life on other planets is steadily becoming a real possibility. But 
in order to realize that search, a definition of life is required. Progress has been made. Life is a complex, but natural 
phenomena that emerged and has been maintained under the dual demands of thermodynamics and evolution. Thus, any 
definition of life must include thermodynamics specifically, as well as evolution generally. A definition of life can be 
obtained through the application of first principles from physics, chemistry and biology. It must encapsulate the 
minimal properties that are shared between all life and demonstrate that the interconnected aspects of life are unique for 
precisely life and that it collectively does things other phenomena do not, as well as describe what life is. Thus, the 
following ab initio definition can be put forward: LifeTerra is a genome-containing, self-sustaining, chemical dissipative 
system that maintains its localized level of organization at the expense of producing entropy in the environment; which 
has developed its numerous characteristics through pluripotential Darwinian evolution.   
 
Keywords: definitions of life, terrestrial life, extra-terrestrial life, first principles.  
 
1. Introduction        
 
As far back in time as humankind has possessed the 
invaluable power of reflection, there have likely been 
those among them that, with unabridged wonder, have 
stirred up at the starry firmament and, with amazement, 
asked themselves what the numerous stars could be.  
    Curious children have turned their unbiased gaze upon 
the stars in the early evenings. Adults, amidst their busy 
existence of food gathering, finding shelter, surviving and 
reproducing, have sat safely at the slowly fading campfire 
in the late evenings, with their eyes irresistibly drawn to 
the majestic stars above. Some of the most curious, most 
dedicated among them, who were filled with the inherent 
human need and desire to explore, to understand and to 
improve, have walked afar from the safety of their fellow 
man, in solitude, to watch the beauty and sheer numbers 
of the stars. Overwhelmed, they have asked themselves 
what the stars above them all could truly be.  
    Now we know! ‗A star is a luminous spheroid of hot 
gas composed mostly of hydrogen and helium, where the 
outward pressure of gas heated by nuclear fusion 
reactions in its core is balanced by the inward pull of the 
force of gravity, leaving the star in a long middle age of 
hydrostatic equilibrium, in which it steadily releases 
energy into outer space.‘ That is what a star is. That is 
what a star does – a star such as the sun.  
    The stars are so far away, while life is so nearby. 
However, the life that we are, the life that we are 
surrounded by, it lack a definition of its own. This is not 
due to a lack of trying. Many definitions have been put 
forward. However, none of the definitions that have 
emerged have been able to encapsulate life entirely.  
    This may seem odd. Just ask yourself the innocent 
question, what is life? You will quickly realize that this is 
not as obvious as it might seem. However, it is important 
to ask, for many reasons. One reason is yet another 
innocent question, namely, is there life elsewhere in the 
cosmos? To be able to answer that, we need to acquire an 
answer to the first question, because we need to 
understand what exactly we are searching for.  
    However, this has proven to be harder than one would 
initially expect. However, why is defining life apparently 
so demanding? Why is it so hard to define a set of 
properties that clearly distinguishes life from non-life?  
    Is it because definitions of life represent an arbitrary 
division of nature, a human construct, whereby 
everything above that division is life and everything 
below is non-life? Is there no threshold of complexity that 
exists by which a collection of molecules can be 
designated as life? Many do seem to think so and that 
such a definition has no place within biology [Luisi, 
1998]. However, such a view would be naive. We already 
know that from the all-encompassing physicist‘s view, 
everything in the universe can be reduced to elementary 
particles and the forces acting between them. These again 
can probably ultimately be reduced to a single 
phenomenon, from which everything else can be derived.  
    Thus, a star can be reduced to its elementary particles 
and the forces acting between them. However, to 
scientists from virtually every discipline, this view is not 
helpful, because it does not remove the fact that stars 
exist and that a threshold exists by which a collection of 
atoms can be designated a star, does exist for them. The 
same is the case in regard to life. Science works on 
different levels of description. Elementary particle 
physics are concerned with the most fundamental 
building blocks. Biology concerns itself with the complex 
form of matter, the supra-molecular collection that 
exchanges matter and energy with its surrounding 
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environment, life. Thus, even though everything probably 
can be reduced to a single phenomenon, this does not 
change that we, on one level of description, have stars, 
planets and life. It does not remove the demand for a 
definition.  
    However, it is correct that it is not a simple matter for 
which to put forward a definition, despite many people 
having an intuitive ability ‗to instantly recognize life, 
discriminating the animate from the inanimate‘ [Gayon, 
2010], or more accurately, many people seem to believe 
that they understand what is meant when they state that 
something is life. Many people may, for instance, face a 
problem in evaluating whether the slime mould Fuligo 
septica is vomit from an animal or is life. The moment 
we attempt to explain what life is, we realize that this is 
not a simple matter. This can be illustrated by the 
following definitions and their counter-examples:  
 
(1) Life is an object that moves around in the 
environment! Do we mean that a dry leaf moved around 
by wind is life, while a tree is not?  
(2) Life is an object that is able to move in the 
environment by its own force! Do we mean that a carrot 
is not life, but that a hurricane is?  
(3) Life is a system that is able to react to its external 
environment! Do we mean that a mercury thermometer, 
which reacts to its external environment, is life?  
(4) Life is a system that is able to metabolize! Do we 
mean that an automobile, which can be said to 
metabolize, is life [Sagan, 1970]?  
(5) Life is an entity that feeds on compounds from the 
environment, returns waste, grows and moves! Do we 
mean that a wild fire, which feeds on compounds, returns 
waste, grows and moves, is life [Tirard et al., 2010]?  
(6) Life is a system that uses energy to produce an 
internal order as part of its dissipative process! Do we 
mean that a hurricane, which generates internal order as it 
dissipates energy, is life [Benner, 2010]?  
(7) Life is an object that exchanges some of its matter 
with the environment, but without changing its own 
general properties and boundary! Do we mean that a 
candle with a well-defined shape and boundary and that is 
maintained by the combination of its waxes with O2, thus 
producing CO2 and H2O, is life [Sagan, 1970]?  
(8) Life is an entity with the ability to reproduce itself! 
Do we mean that a reproducing fire is life, while mules 
and most honeybees are not?  
(9) Life is a self-sustaining system with imbedded 
information that it can pass on to construct a new and 
similar system! Do we mean that a crystal of sodium 
chlorate with its right-handed or left-handed chirality 
features, which it can pass on to new and similar crystals, 
is life [Benner, 2010]?  
(10) Life is a platonic form or a natural kind with intrinsic 
properties! Do we mean that a species, with its fuzzy 
boundaries and whose genotypic and phenotypic 
properties gradually change or are eliminated over time, 
is not life?  
 
Thus, the statement ‗I recognize when I see it‘ [Popa, 
2010] is hard to justify. The history of science is one long 
display of the elimination of intuitive perceptions of 
nature that did not agree with reality. For instance, 
basically all of our intuitive views of the subatomic world 
are in conflict with that world. Humankind has indeed 
evolved some talent in differentiating life from non-life, 
but that might not help much when we search for life 
beyond Earth.  
    Another point here is that this common approach of 
listing life‘s characteristics, such as reproduction, growth, 
metabolism, etc., has been stated as being insufficient 
because these characteristics are seen as not unique for 
life [Benner, 2010]. Furthermore, this approach describes 
what life does rather than what life is.  
    However, I will say that the mere fact that 
characteristics of life are not unique for life is not an issue 
in itself. Life is a complex phenomenon, but it is a natural 
phenomenon that is part of the universe such as 
everything else. Thus, it should not be surprising at all 
that it shares its characteristics with other natural 
phenomena, or more accurately, incorporates natural 
phenomena.  
    Life is an interconnected cluster of aspects, and it is 
important to demonstrate that the collected aspects of life 
is unique precisely to life forms, in that life collectively 
do things other phenomena do not. It is the 
interconnected cluster of aspects, not the singular aspects 
in themselves, that are important to define. Furthermore, 
what life does and what life is seem to be the same, from 
a scientific point of view. For example, a star is a 
spheroid of gas, which fuses hydrogen into helium, thus 
releasing radiation in the process. That is what a star 
does; that is what a star is. A division between ‗does‘ and 
‗is‘ seems to diminish the understanding of the star.  
    A definition of life will be obtained in this work 
through first principles that stem from physics, chemistry 
and biology. The desirable definition must encapsulate 
the minimal properties that are shared between all life and 
connect physicochemical and biological first principles.      
 
2. Representative definitions        
 
Many advanced definitions of life have been put forward 
in the course of time by scientists from different 
disciplines holding a multitude of diverging interests and 
research traditions. In fact, more than 100 recorded 
definitions of life have (many of these overlap) been put 
forward [Trifonov, 2011], probably more, too many to be 
mentioned here.  
    Thus, I will mention only a couple, mainly those I 
consider representative and indeed incorporate single 
essential aspects of life. They will here roughly be 
divided into evolutionary definitions, thermodynamic 
definitions, and biophysical definitions.  
 
2.1. Evolutionary definitions.  
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(i) Life is a material system that undergoes reproduction, 
mutation, and natural selection [McKay, 1991].  
(ii) Life is a self-sustained chemical system capable of 
undergoing Darwinian evolution [Joyce, 1994].  
(iii) Life (a living individual) is a self-sustaining object 
belonging to a set of elements capable of undergoing 
Darwinian evolution [Chodasewicz, 2014].   
 
It is clear that such definitions indeed encapsulate 
characteristics for life. Such definitions focus essentially 
on life as a system with the capacity to perform a number 
of functions, such as, e.g., reproducing, metabolizing and 
growing.  
    Life follows the laws of physics and chemistry, but 
what sets biology apart is that it also has a history. 
Physics and chemistry do not truly have historical 
attributes; they do not need to record themselves to be 
physics and chemistry. However, it has long been 
recognized that biological phenomena do.  
    Thus, evolutionary definitions have, for good reason, 
become very influential. They shape our understanding of 
what life is, what it does and how it originated. One 
definition that has become highly influential is (ii). This 
definition, which is the result of a committee assembled 
in 1994 by NASA to discuss the possibility of extra-
terrestrial life in the universe, is indeed a powerful one.  
    However, there are some issues with the Darwinian 
definitions of life. Not all life is capable of reproduction, 
despite obviously deriving from evolution. Mules are 
born sterile. Most honeybees do not reproduce. Cells such 
as human neurons do not divide. So not all life is capable 
of Darwinian evolution. Thus, organisms without the 
ability to reproduce are ipso facto inanimate objects in 
such definitions of life, which is obviously very counter-
intuitive [Chodasewicz, 2014].  
    It has been attempted to clarify that single entities can 
be alive without themselves individually exemplifying 
life in such definitions. However, attempting to defuse 
this problem by creating two categories, namely, ‗life‘ 
and ‗living entities‘, appear to be more of an ad hoc effort 
[Cleland and Chyba, 2002]. A definition must state this 
by itself.  
    However, the fact remains that such definitions 
manage to stay clear of many of the counter-examples 
that are listed in the introduction.  
 
2.2. Thermodynamic definitions.  
 
(iv) Living systems maintain themselves in a state of 
relatively low entropy at the expense of their nonliving 
environments [Hitchcock and Lovelock, 1967].   
(v) Living systems might ... be defined as localized 
regions where there is a continuous increase in order … 
at the expense of a larger decrease in order of the 
universe outside [Sagan, 1970].  
(vi) Life emerges because thermodynamics mandates 
order from disorder whenever thermodynamic gradients 
and environmental conditions exist [Schneider and Kay, 
1994].   
 
It is clear that such definitions indeed encapsulate 
characteristics for life. Such definitions focus on life‘s 
ability to reduce its internal entropy at the expense of 
increasing it in the surrounding environment. Entropy is 
an exact measure of energy dispersal in a process at a 
specific temperature amongst particles, if not hindered 
from doing so [Lambert, 2006]. Furthermore, energy 
disperses spatially, making it possible for energy of a 
group of particles that move together to dissipate.  
    Lehninger (1982) argued in the same tradition as 
Boltzmann and Schrödinger, the following: 
 
‗Living organisms preserve their internal order by taking 
from their surroundings free energy, in the form of 
nutrients or sunlight, and returning to their surroundings 
an equal amount of energy as heat and entropy‘.  
 
Life is, thus, an entropy producing system; the 
organization that is produced within an organism as it 
maintains itself and metabolizes far from the 
thermodynamic equilibrium is compensated for by the 
increased entropy it creates in its surrounding 
environment during the course of maintenance and 
metabolism. That observation is a powerful one indeed.  
    However, there are some issues with entropy 
definitions of life. Taking compounds from the 
environment, returning waste, and growing are qualities 
that life has in common with fire. One can, of course, 
point out that fire only dissipates free energy, while life 
uses free energy to produce internal order as part of its 
dissipative process. However, a fire whirl that emerges 
when rising heat and turbulent wind conditions join 
together and create a tornado-like vortex also generates 
internal order as it dissipates free energy to the 
environment [Benner, 2010].      
    Thus, attempting to defuse such counter-examples to 
be minor or irrelevant exceptions appears to be ill-
advised. A definition of life must steer clear of this or 
clarify the difference.  
    However, the fact remains that, although the entropy 
reduction point does not manage to avoid sharing this 
aspect with other non-life phenomena, it nevertheless still 
demonstrates an essential aspect of life.  
 
2.3. Biophysical definitions.  
 
(vii) All free-living organisms are autonomous agents … 
a system able to reproduce itself and carry out at least one 
work cycle [Kauffman, 2004].  
(viii) A living being is any autonomous system with 
open-ended evolutionary capacities [Ruiz-Mirazo et al., 
2004].  
(ix) Life … is a complex, thermodynamically open, 
autopoietic system capable of undergoing Darwinian 
evolution [Tirard et al., 2010].  
HAL archives-ouvertes.fr | CCSD, August, 2019.  
 
4 
 
 
Such definitions demonstrate that progress has been made 
and that some efforts are more fruitful than others. It is 
clear from physics that thermodynamics, with its far-
from-equilibrium and entropy displacement, must be 
included in a definition of life. It is equally clear from 
biology that evolution, with its concept of mutability, 
reproduction and natural selection, must be included in a 
definition of life. Any definition of life must include 
thermodynamics specifically; any definition of life must 
include evolution generally.  
    Thus, such definitions wisely attempt to include both. 
Nevertheless, the demand of generality and broadness has 
so far been at odds with them, and they do not manage to 
encapsulate life entirely nor steer clear of nor clarify 
some of the counter-examples.  
    As mentioned in the introduction, life is an 
interconnected cluster of aspects. These are shared by 
other natural phenomena. However, that only life shares 
all of these aspects at once is what a definition must give, 
and it must further avoid that obviously living organisms 
are not classified as non-life by it; a definition must also 
be logically self-consistent.  
 
3. First principles  
 
As seen with the definitions put forward, all of them have 
been insufficient to entirely define life. For either they 
have not been able to cover all aspects of life or have met 
counter-examples. However, some of these definitions do 
indeed encapsulate important singular aspects of what life 
is and what life does. However, the sheer number of the 
definitions and the lack of consensus among scientists 
have led to a critique of the whole enterprise [Bich and 
Green, 2018].  
 
3.1. Philosophy of language.  
 
A more philosophically grounded critique has also 
emerged. Thus, it has been claimed that definitions are 
limited conceptual tools; they inform about the meanings 
of terms in human language, rather than informing about 
nature. Thus, ‗definitions specify meanings of terms by 
dissecting concepts that we already possess‘ [Cleland and 
Chyba, 2002]. Thus, Benner (2010) refers to the 
following correspondence:  
 
‗According to the classical philosophical understanding 
of ‗‗definition,‘‘ a definition must give both necessary 
and sufficient conditions, and must do that as a matter of 
the meaning of the term. For instance, the claim that 
water equals H2O arguably specifies both necessary and 
sufficient conditions, but it doesn‘t do that as a matter of 
the meaning of the word ‗‗water.‘‘ The claim is a 
posteriori. A definition, on this classical understanding, 
must be a priori—at least its justification must be a priori 
(because it is supposed to be an analytic claim—true 
solely in virtue of the meaning of the terms involved). It 
turns out that, when understood this way, [a definition] is 
almost impossible to find‘.  
 
Of course, such views may have their own problems. The 
philosophical distinction between propositions called 
analytic and synthetic propositions can be given by the 
following definitions [Rey, 2010]:  
 
(i) Analytic propositions are true by virtue of their 
meaning. Example: All triangles have three sides.  
(ii) Synthetic propositions are true by how their meaning 
relates to the world. Example: All bachelors are alone.  
 
A further distinction can be given between a priori and a 
posteriori propositions. These can be given by the 
following definitions [Kant, 1781]:   
 
(iii) An a priori proposition is one whose justification 
does not rely upon experience. Example: 7 + 5 = 12.  
(iv) An a posteriori proposition is one whose justification 
does rely upon experience. Example: All bachelors are 
unhappy.  
 
However, if one posits that there only exist analytic and 
synthetic propositions and that anything else apparently is 
meaningless, then one can ask the obvious question about 
whether the proposition, ‘that there only exist analytic 
and synthetic propositions‘, is in itself an analytic 
proposition?  
    If the answer is yes, then it is ipso facto not about the 
actual world, since it is only true by virtue of its meaning. 
If one asks whether it is a synthetic proposition, and the 
answer is yes, then it ipso facto cannot be held as 
absolutely true, since it is only true by how its meaning 
relates to the world.  
    The same can be inquired regarding a priori and a 
posteriori propositions, leading to similar results. Either 
way, it would appear that there are inherent problems in 
these well-known distinctions between propositions, and 
their implementation in scientific formalism, thus, seem 
to be of little relevance.  
    Other types of definitions critiques have also been put 
forward regarding them as being limited conceptual tools 
[Cleland and Chyba, 2002]. Thus, two kinds of 
definitions should be distinguished, namely, lexical and 
stipulative definitions. While the latter, especially, can 
possess great precision with its adoption of a rule, it is 
nevertheless still a limited tool in regard to providing a 
general definition of life in relation to specific scientific 
theories [Gayon, 2010].  
    Again, there seems to be problems with such views. 
The distinction between lexical and stipulative definitions 
can be given by the following definitions:  
 
(i) A ‗lexical definition gives or explains the meaning of 
a word by referring to the linguistic usage of this very 
word by certain people at certain places and time‘ 
[Malaterre, 2010].  
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(ii) A ‗stipulative definition deliberately assign a meaning 
to a word, for the purpose of clarifying arguments. It may 
agree with the common use of a word, but it may also 
contradict it‘ [Gayon, 2010].  
 
However, if one posits that it must be defined that way, 
that one should distinguish between lexical and 
stipulative definitions and that anything else apparently is 
meaningless; then, once again, one can ask the obvious 
question about whether the formulation, ‘one should 
distinguish between lexical and stipulative definitions‘, is 
in itself a stipulative definition?  
    If the answer is yes, then it is ipso facto not about the 
actual world, since it deliberately assigns a meaning to a 
word. If one asks whether it is a lexical definition, and the 
answer is yes, then it ipso facto cannot be held as 
absolute true, since it is just the linguistic usage of this 
very word at certain places and time.  
    Once again, it would appear that there are inherent 
problems in these distinctions, and their implementation 
in scientific formalism, thus, seems to be of little 
relevance for the scientific enterprise. Words are human-
made, and terms are human-made, but this does not entail 
the conclusion that what they cover is human-made.  
    The words reactants and products are clearly human-
made, and humans from a variety of different cultures can 
call them anything they like. However, the relationship 
between them, the chemical reaction, is not human-made. 
Thus, instead of this ‘swamp of language,‘ we might be 
better suited in adhering to first principles.  
 
3.2. First principles.  
 
A first principle, from which a demonstration begins, is 
explanatorily primitive [Gasser-Wingate, 2016]. It is a 
basic, self-evident proposition that cannot, or more 
accurately, as understood in science, does not need to be 
demonstrated from any other proposition to be applied.  
    First principles are well-known in physics, where 
theoretical work is stated to be from first principles or ab 
initio (from the beginning), if such work starts with the 
most essential facts.  
    First principles also exist in biology. Thus, evolution 
can, for example, be illustrated very well through the 
application of first principles without alluding to any 
theory or literature (see Varki, 2012). Thus, natural 
selection is a first principle, imperfect reproduction is a 
first principle, and life expanding in population size until 
it is constrained is a first principle, etc.  
    These last principles can all be explained on a deeper 
level, but the fact of the matter is that it is not necessary 
herein to grasp evolution. Throughout the history of 
science, many phenomena have been discovered and 
described without anyone knowing what is was. Thus, for 
instance, the Belousov-Zhabotinsky reaction, a 
temporally oscillating chemical reaction with pattern 
formation, was discovered by Belousov, who had no 
theory of it. Nevertheless, he could still describe this first 
principle [Taylor, 2002].  
    First principles also exist in philosophy, albeit they are 
usually not realized as being such. For example, humans 
made terms, such as stationary and movement, slow and 
fast, cold and warm. However, when such terms are used 
in communication, they must be applied in a certain way 
in relation to each other. This certain way is not, 
however, something humans have agreed upon; it is 
something dictated by the structure of the universe 
[Favrholdt, 1999].  
    Terms such as movement, distance, velocity and time 
are human-made, and different cultures have different 
designations for them. However, a first principle, such as 
‘the faster he (or anyone) moves from one location to 
another, the less time it takes‘ clarifies a fact because the 
term's location, movement, distance, velocity and time 
stands in a certain interdependent relationship with each 
other in the actual world.  
    A similar situation occurs for the terms light and 
heavy. They are linguistic terms, but the relation ‗ten 
apples weighs more than five apples‘ is not something 
humans have invented or agreed upon; it is a first 
principle humans have clarified.  
    There are many words for cold and warm. However, 
spontaneously going from warm to cold is a relation that 
is independent of the linguistic invention of words. 
Thermodynamics is formulated by using a long list of 
terms, which were all human-made. Nevertheless, the 
thermodynamic – and communicative – relation between 
them always stays the same.  
    Consider the first principles involving time. It is a 
basic human observation that there is a sequence of 
events to which the terms before, now and after are 
attached. This is a fact that is independent of humans. 
When humans clarify a description, then how the term 
time shall be used in relation to movement, velocity, 
acceleration, etc., must be established first. Clarifying 
such first principles is a scientific enterprise that is 
different from the cultural enterprise of inventing 
linguistic words for time.  
    One could say that this is only first principles in 
physics, where it is clarified how we necessarily must 
talk about movement, velocity, time, weight and 
temperature, etc., to describe something. However, they 
are also unavoidable first principles in the philosophy of 
language, although this might not follow the traditional 
formulations of first principles.  
    Thus, a human is entitled to believe that the faster he 
(or anyone) moves from one location to another, the 
longer time it takes. However, such a person will very 
likely not survive for long in the wild nature or in traffic 
if he is not able to grasp that the world does not work that 
way. The world forces him to act in a certain way 
regardless of his beliefs. This is not restricted only to 
obeying the reality of physics. It also involves obeying 
the reality of language usage. If someone states that the 
faster he (or anyone) moves from one location to another, 
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the longer time it takes, then he ipso facto does not 
unambiguously clarify a relation at all, because the 
universe does not work that way.  
    If, for instance, this person is tasked with guiding 
another person in a car over the phone, and he guides the 
driver while watching from a distance, then his 
communication has to follow the descriptive relation 
between movement, distance, velocity and time; 
otherwise, the person in the car will not drive safely in 
traffic for long.  
    Thus, claiming that because words and terms are 
human-made, they then only inform about the meanings 
of words and terms in human language, rather than 
informing about nature, and that they are a web of terms 
that humans have constructed over the universe and, 
thereby, have given it a human-made structure, seems 
contrary to evidence.  
    First principles derive from the fact that the universe is 
structured in a certain way, and this certain way forces its 
inhabitants to both act and communicate in a certain way. 
Human elementary language is evolutionarily shaped by 
this certain way in order for humans to be able to 
communicate unambiguously with each other. This is 
also why humankind will be able to communicate with 
hypothetical extra-terrestrial civilizations. Both are forced 
to act and communicate this same way.  
    Thus, first principles are not platonic forms, nor 
analytic or synthetic propositions. They are not synthetic 
a priori propositions either, because this assumes that we 
structure the world with language, rather than it is the 
world that structures language. Why should we commit 
belief in any of these, when the justifications is so weak? 
We follow first principles both in acts and in 
communication, regardless of our personal philosophical 
position, to make ourselves understandable and to interact 
in the universe. That is their strength. That is the lesson 
of science.  
 
3. An ab initio definition of life  
 
Thus, on such an ab initio foundation, I can now proceed 
in putting forward a first strict formulation of a definition 
of life:  
 
LifeTerra is a genome-containing, self-sustaining chemical 
dissipative system that maintains its localized level of 
organization at the expense of producing entropy in the 
environment; which has developed its numerous 
characteristics through pluripotential Darwinian 
evolution.  
 
3.1. Present and past tense.  
 
Notice the present tense ‘is‘ and the past tense ‘has‘ in the 
full definition. This emphasis is not a mere word game 
but is a crucial point for a stringent definition. A 
definition has to be both in the present and in the past 
tense. We can, once again, take the example of the mule, 
which is a hybrid of a horse and a donkey, to illuminate 
why this is so.  
    A mule is clearly a living organism that ‗is a genome-
containing, self-sustaining chemical dissipative system 
that maintains its local level of organization at the 
expense of producing environmental entropy‘. A mule is 
clearly a living organism which ‗has developed its 
numerous characteristics through pluripotential 
Darwinian evolution‘.  
    All mule predecessors have been able to reproduce and 
have reproduced, meaning that reproduction has led up to 
the present mule‘s existence. However, the mule itself is 
not able to reproduce. Thus, the mule fulfils all demands 
of Darwinian evolution in the past tense.  
    A mule‘s reproduction or lack thereof is something a 
definition has to account for, and not doing so is 
something that evolutionary definitions has been 
criticized for [Chodasewicz, 2014]. Attempting to save 
evolutionary definitions by differentiating life as a single 
individual entity and as a population, where it is the latter 
that makes the reproductive living system, is not 
satisfactory.  
    We could easily come up with a thought experiment, a 
global event for instance, wherein a human-made (or 
even a natural) genetically engineered virus makes all 
horses on Earth sterile, or that humankind wants to get rid 
of the entire species of mosquitoes by making them all 
sterile. This will, of course, mean that the whole 
population of horses or the entire species of mosquitoes 
will die out eventually. However, until they do, is the 
population or the species not life? Of course they are.  
    Evolution has a historical dimension. Biology is very 
much connected with its history, unlike (most) physics, 
which are one of the things that makes biology so rich 
and complex. This has been acknowledged elsewhere. 
Already Bernal wrote the following:  
 
‗Life involved another element, logically different from 
those occurring in physics at that time, by no means a 
mystical one, but an element of history. The phenomena 
of biology must be … contingent on events‘ [Bernal, 
1959].  
 
Thus, a definition of life requires both recognition of the 
ahistorical status of the laws of physics and chemistry as 
well as biology‘s historical contingency. To quote 
Stephen Jay Gould:   
 
‗Human evolution is not random; it makes sense and can 
be explained after the fact. But wind back life‘s tape to 
the dawn of time and let it play again–and you will never 
get humans a second time‘ [Gould, 1991].  
 
This means that, although convergent evolution might 
lead to primate-like animals again, Homo sapiens will not 
emerge again, despite the fact that the laws of physics and 
chemistry, as well as the principles in Darwinian 
evolution, are the same.  
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    Thermodynamics do not, in the same sense, possess a 
historical dimension; it is the outcome of more timeless 
first principles from physics and is, in that sense, simpler 
than biology. Place a cup of coffee with a specific high 
temperature and a cup of milk with a specific lower 
temperature in an area of uniform temperature between 
the coffee and milk temperature. Over time, coffee will 
cool down and the milk will warm up. Eventually, both 
fluids will be at the same temperature as the area, and, 
thus, will reach thermal equilibrium. Repeat the 
experiment with the same conditions, and there is an 
extremely high probability that you will obtain the same 
result. Biology is different from thermodynamics in that 
it is both a process and a record of history. 
    A mule has to maintain its internal organization at the 
expense of the surrounding environment, i.e., taking in 
energy internally and displacing entropy externally to 
maintain being a living organism. The moment it is not 
able to do that, it is no longer a living organism. 
However, a mule does not need to reproduce to stay a 
living organism. Although reproduction is a fundamental 
aspect in evolution, there is nothing in evolution that with 
absolute certainty enforces an organism to reproduce; 
however, evolution obviously requires that the 
predecessors of any organism have reproduced.  
    This emphasis in definition is, thus, not ad hoc. It is the 
clarification of a fundamental fact. We can only talk 
about a mule in the current here and now, and in the past.  
 
3.2. Darwinian evolution.  
 
Simply writing ‗Darwinian evolution‘ could appear to be 
unnecessarily short. However, the phrase is actually 
shorthand for a process and mechanism that encompasses 
a vast body of ongoing research. Thus, writing 
‗Darwinian evolution‘ is sufficient, because it has a long-
associated property list: it encompasses imperfect self-
replication and reproduction, natural selection, sexual 
selection, neutral drift, purifying selection, mutability, 
heritability, and adaptability. It even reflects the 
composition and history of an ecosystem.  
    Darwinian evolution is an exceptional powerful way to 
structure matter. It is not only a process but is also a 
record of what has shown itself adaptive at the time. 
Thus, Darwinian evolution is by many considered as the 
best diagnostic feature of life [Popa, 2010].  
    Physics puts some restrictions on the possibilities that 
life can explore, although life, so far, has demonstrated a 
remarkably rich diversity. Thus, the phrase 
‗pluripotential‘ in front of Darwinian evolution clarifies 
the vast but not infinitely open-ended capacity of life.  
    The definition steers clear of the counter-examples that 
are listed in the introduction. The requirement for 
imperfect reproduction, where the imperfections are 
themselves reproducible, elegantly eliminates non-life 
chemical systems with the capability to reproduce.  
    Kondepudi et al. (1990) showed, for example, that a 
crystal of sodium chlorate can be powdered and used to 
seed the growth of new crystals, that is, reproducing. It is 
even capable of imperfect reproduction, as it contains 
many defects. However, the phrase steers clear of this 
otherwise profound counter-example in that the 
information in the crystal defects is not themselves 
inheritable via this process. It is not possible for the 
defects in the progenitor crystal to be passed along to the 
descendent crystals via this process, and adapted 
descendants do not emerge this way. Thus, the sodium 
chlorate system is not capable of supporting or competing 
with Darwinian evolution [Benner, 2010].  
    The phrase also clarifies an essential difference 
between fire and life, since the first one is not capable of 
Darwinian evolution either.  
    Nevertheless, there have been suggested exceptions to 
Darwinian evolution. It is possible that early life on the 
Earth went through a period of reproduction without 
replication, in which Darwinian evolution was not yet in 
place [Dyson, 1985]. In Dyson‘s double-origin theory, 
protein-based beings capable of metabolism predated the 
development of nucleic acid-based replication.  
    Thus, it has been suggested that a world of naked RNA 
molecular life is possible, in which such life would 
conflate phenotype with genotype, thereby allowing 
limited Lamarckian (i.e., inheritance of acquired 
properties) as well as Darwinian evolution [Cleland and 
Chyba, 2002].  
    This issue could, of course, easily be solved by writing 
‗has developed its numerous characteristics through 
pluripotential evolution‘, by using evolution in a more 
relaxed and general sense.  
    However, it has been pointed out that Lamarckian 
evolution can be considered more a complement to than a 
denial of natural selection since such RNA life can still 
undergo evolution through natural selection, even if 
Darwinian evolution is assisted by other types of 
evolution. Thus, the naked RNA molecular life can be 
included in the Darwinian framework if they are capable 
of undergoing the Darwinian process too [Chodasewicz, 
2014].  
 
3.3. Chemical and biological evolution.  
 
In the definition of life, the origin of life, abiogenesis or 
chemical evolution, should perhaps also have been 
mentioned in form of an extra phrase. Thus, the phrase 
‗that has developed its numerous characteristics through 
chemical and pluripotential Darwinian evolution‘ should 
be present.  
    However, this would imply that there is a fundamental 
difference between the first principles in chemical 
evolution and biological evolution, or between 
thermodynamics and chemical evolution. It is correct that 
there is still much to learn about major portions of the 
processes that lead to the appearance of the first life. 
However, simply falling back on life as an emergent 
attribute of matter appears not only alien for prebiotic 
chemistry research but also has to have little relationship 
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with our current understanding of actual chemical and 
biological phenomena [Lazcano, 2010].  
    Nevertheless, if chemical evolution turns out to follow 
some first principles that are not shared by biological 
evolution or requires some specific factors different from 
thermodynamics to take place, then the introduction of 
this phrase is needed. Strictly speaking, until the first 
truly living cell arises in a laboratory and provides us 
with an answer, it is not clear whether there should be 
such an extra phrase.  
    However, chemical reactions demand thermodynamics 
to take place, and it has been demonstrated that in an 
open thermodynamic system, the order of such a system 
will increase as the energy flows through it [Prigogine 
and Stengers, 1984]. Furthermore, this occurs through the 
spontaneous development of cycles in the system. One 
example is the cyclic chemical phenomena known as the 
Belousov-Zhabotinsky reaction [Taylor, 2002]. Thus, 
biological cycles may merely be an exploitation of 
thermodynamic cycles that already existed before life 
arose [Sagan, 1970].  
    In fact, self-assembly and complexification do exist in 
a wide range of systems that are part of living systems but 
are not themselves life, such as in the auto-organization 
of lipidic molecules in bilayers, micelles, and liposomes 
[Farmer, 2005].  
    A difference between non-life and life could, perhaps, 
be said to be the difference between chemistry and 
biochemistry. However, that is probably not a good 
distinction. Instead, chemistry is distinctive from 
biochemistry in that the latter has a history that was 
developed through Darwinian evolution. It is Darwinian 
evolution that evolved the functional molecules that 
transformed chemistry into biochemistry, and 
biochemistry into biology.  
    Thus, the consensus in the prebiotic research 
community appears to be that life is seen as the 
evolutionary transition between chemical systems and 
biomolecular networks. An evolutionary continuum 
exists where thermodynamics and evolutionary processes 
in the proper environmental conditions facilitate prebiotic 
synthesis and the accumulation of organic molecules into 
self-sustaining replicating systems, that is, life.  
    Thus, an extra phrase appears to be unnecessary, since 
abiogenesis subsumes into thermodynamics and 
Darwinian evolution, which is facilitated by both 
causality and probability. It does not require extra 
principles to have taken place. The first definition will, 
thus, be sufficient.  
    In fact, just as natural selection among those individual 
organisms whose variations were most beneficial under 
the given circumstances is a non-random process, the 
origin of life may be a non-random process by which ‗the 
origin and evolution of life … can be understood as 
resulting from the natural thermodynamic imperative of 
increasing the entropy production of the Earth in its 
interaction with its solar environment‘ [Michaelian, 
2011]. Time will tell.  
 
3.4. Dissipative system.  
 
Just as the phrase ‗Darwinian evolution‘ expresses a long, 
implicit list, ‗dissipative system‘ is also a phrase that is 
shorthand for a huge body of ongoing research. 
A dissipative structure is an open thermodynamic system 
that operates far from equilibrium and is characterized by 
a spontaneous structural and functional order and by a 
low value of entropy [Prigogine and Lefever, 1968].  
    Such a system in which energy is continuously 
imported from and entropy is released into the 
surrounding environment is thought to be essential for 
biological processes [Prigogine and Stengers, 1984].  
    A more intuitive way to grasp energy and entropy in 
terms of life may be to imagine a type of generalized 
water-mill, in which free energy is flowing from higher 
quality to lower quality, that is, energy dispersal, and 
during the flow of energy, the mill-wheel is turning, 
producing internal organization in the mill. This mill is 
life, and the turning-wheel is the very mechanism that 
decreases entropy by displacing it into the environment. 
Thus, as long as Gibbs free energy flows through the 
mill-wheel, it maintains life far from thermodynamic 
equilibrium; that is, it produces internal information 
content.  
    The phrase that is accompanied by the rest of the 
definition avoids some of the counter-examples that are 
listed in the introduction. It clarifies the difference 
between itself and non-life systems, which can be utilized 
far from the thermodynamic equilibrium.  
    For example, a hurricane formation serves a 
fundamental thermodynamic purpose, which consists of a 
movement of moist air up to higher altitudes, where 
condensation occurs, thus markedly accelerating the 
transfer of heat from the warm ocean waters to the cooler 
layers of the atmosphere. In that way, the hurricane 
elegantly acts to reduce a temperature gradient and, 
thereby, increases the entropy of its surrounding 
environment, which is, thus, an example in which a 
complex structure arises and produces an internal order as 
it dissipates energy into the environment [Schneider and 
Sagan, 2006].  
    However, the information or order in that system has 
not itself arisen through Darwinian evolution. That 
system uses free energy to produce order as part of its 
dissipative process, but it has not developed this 
characteristic through Darwinian evolution, and the 
information is not itself inheritable. Therefore, the system 
cannot support Darwinian evolution.  
    It might be objected that there is repetition in the 
definition. Metabolism is one of the numerous 
characteristics of evolution. Being able to metabolize 
involves being able to do energy transformation, which 
automatically implies thermodynamics.  
    Nevertheless, there is a dichotomy here. Because 
although evolution requires thermodynamics to take 
place, thermodynamics do not require evolution in order 
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to take place. On the other hand, thermodynamics are 
necessary for life, but they are not sufficient. Life 
requires evolution to arise and to develop. Thus, there is 
not a reciprocal relationship. It is possible to differentiate 
between metabolism and thermodynamics.  
    For instance, while metabolism is a characteristic of 
life, it is not a narrow enough guideline as an indicator 
for life elsewhere. The Viking Landers on Mars in 1976 
tested for metabolic clues to life in the soil [Klein, 1999]. 
They found a reaction in two of the experiments, which 
appeared to be analogous to reactions that were observed 
with terrestrial microorganisms. Thus, one might 
conclude that life in the Martian soil was consuming 
nutrients and releasing CO2 as a waste by-product. 
However, it has become clear since then, that the Martian 
soil has a special chemistry wherein one or more 
inorganic oxidants that are present in the soil could 
produce a metabolic-like reaction [Klein, 1999]. Thus, a 
metabolic-like reaction can be a strong indication of the 
presence of life, but it is not sufficient, while the absence 
of one is a strong indication that life is not present on a 
planet.  
    Furthermore, an entropy reduction is an essential 
characteristic of life, meaning that the chemical 
composition of a planet‘s atmosphere is far from 
thermodynamic equilibrium if there is life on it 
[Hitchcock and Lovelock, 1967]. However, the existence 
of an entropy reduction on a planet is not sufficient as an 
indicator of life, since other factors might create a redox 
disequilibrium, while the absence of one is a strong 
indication that life is not present on a planet.  
    However, if there is both a metabolic-like reaction in 
the soil and an entropy reduction in a planet‘s 
atmosphere, then it is a very strong indicator of life. Thus, 
again it is possible to differentiate between them.  
 
3.5. Maintains vs. maintaining.  
 
It is well-known that there exist many forms of healthy 
life that are capable of existing deep within the ordered 
regime of thermodynamics, as evidenced by hibernation 
and dormancy in plants, and life, thus, can reduce or 
postpone its utilization of energy and displacement of 
entropy to the surroundings [Macklem and Seely, 2010].  
    Spores are capable of staying dormant and ceasing to 
have metabolic activity at low temperatures for extremely 
long periods, such as hundreds or possibly even 
thousands of years. However, these spores can return to 
life when being subjected to more fitting conditions 
suitable for germination, growth, and reproduction 
[Sagan, 1970].   
    Mars appears to have once been a more hospitable 
place for life [McKay and Stoker, 1989]. If life arose 
there in the past, then some of it could have survived but 
is dormant to this day. Thus, there is an interest in 
investigating whether life from Earth could survive in the 
present-day conditions of Mars, which indeed seems to be 
the case, assuming that bacterial endospores are 
sufficiently shielded from solar irradiation [Wassmann et 
al., 2012].  
    Thus, instead of writing ‗maintains its localized level‘ 
in the definition, I should instead write ‗capable of 
maintaining its localized level‘. The first phrase means 
that life continuously maintains it, while the latter phrase 
means that life can maintain it with interruptions.  
    However, there is debate as to whether such life truly 
has a complete cease of metabolism, or whether there still 
is an extremely slow metabolism that, so to speak, still 
‗leaks‘ and that a sufficiently sophisticated experiment 
could find. There is some evidence that there is, indeed, 
minimal metabolism of exogenous or endogenous 
compounds in the dormant spores of Bacillus species 
[Ghosh et al., 2015]. There is also evidence that there is 
rRNA degradation in the spores of Bacillus subtilis held 
at physiological temperatures, as well as indications of 
some gene expression taking place in them [Ghosh et al., 
2015].  
    Thus, whether there are spores that truly can put 
metabolism to a complete halt is still a debated question. 
If they can, then it is, of course, remarkable, since this 
generally designates an organism that has ceased to be 
living. However, if they do have a metabolism, then they 
does not possess an inert immortality, the second law of 
thermodynamics will be in effect, and the first phrase is 
sufficient.   
 
3.6. Genomes and information.  
 
The phrase ‗self-sustaining chemical system‘ is already 
well-known from earlier definitions [see Joyce, 1994]. 
Life is a chemical system, but there exist many chemical 
systems that obtain an internal order and undergo cycles 
and non-retraceable trajectories that are not life [Brack 
and Troublé, 2010].  
    The latter systems are not truly self-sustained of 
course. They eventually come to a halt on their own. The 
phrase refers to the chemical system as being self-
sustaining in a way that does not require a scientist in the 
laboratory to keep it going; it only requires external 
energy, and, very importantly, requires information to do 
so.  
    Life contains its hereditary and messenger information 
in DNA and RNA, which are collectively designated the 
genome. Stating a distinction between ‗genome-
containing‘ and ‗chemical system‘ in the definition could, 
perhaps, be considered a repetition, since one may argue 
that information is already an implicit part of the phrase 
‗self-sustaining chemical system‘. However, that seems 
to be ad hoc. A definition should clarify this on its own.  
    Nevertheless, a definition requiring embedded 
instructions in the form of DNA and RNA may be too 
narrow. Thus, there may be other systems of molecular 
memory that are possible in the cosmos and enable life 
that do not contain information in this form. As 
mentioned earlier, it is possible that early life on the Earth 
went through a period of reproduction without replication 
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[Cleland and Chyba, 2002]. In this double-origin 
scenario, protein-based beings that are capable of 
metabolism predated the development of genome-based 
replication.  
    Thus, we might imagine that life on this planet in the 
past and on other worlds in the universe does not contain 
its information as genetic information but contains it in a 
different kind of structure. The demand is fundamentally 
only this, that all of the information necessary for a 
collective system such a life to undergo evolution 
necessarily must be present within that very collective 
system.  
    Thus, writing that life is ‘genome-containing‘ might 
then be too specific a demand. Writing ‘information-
containing‘ is weaker but is also a more general 
definition. However, the fact is, of course, that all life on 
Earth has its heredity information in a genome, a 
molecular habitat of expanding and mutating simple 
tandem repeats, which evidently is a highly efficient way 
to maintain and pass on information.  
    Thus, for present day Earth-based life, the definition 
should stay true to that fact.  
 
3.7. Specific vs. general.  
 
Notice that the definition writes ‗LifeTerra‘. This probably 
goes counter to what is traditionally demanded of a 
general definition of life, but it is, for now, unavoidable.  
    All life on Earth shares common properties. All life 
shares the same molecular models and the same 
macromolecules [Raulin, 2010]. Thus, all terrestrial life 
use virtually identical DNA for hereditary information, 
all life use proteins to control biochemical reaction rates, 
and all apply identical ATP molecules to store energy. 
Thus, we see the same fundamental biochemistry in 
organisms such as bacteria and Homo sapiens.  
    This is hardly surprising at all, since all current 
terrestrial life, ranging from bacteria to Homo sapiens, 
descend from a universal ancestor (LUCA), which is the 
single common ancestor to us all. This means that all data 
about life comes from only one example of life, one 
available data point that is Earth based [Weiss et al., 
2018]. Thus, a definition must stringently write ‗LifeTerra‘. 
    Given just one data point makes it difficult to 
distinguish which properties of terrestrial life are unique 
and which properties of life are truly universal. Thus, the 
concern is that we do not know which features of 
terrestrial life are just accidents of history [McKay, 
2004]. This can only change if we find life on a different 
world. Astrobiology could, thus, help solve this debate by 
finding potential alternative life forms that have evolved 
independently beyond the Earth.  
    This point is entirely valid. However, even if we find 
life on Mars, Europa, Titan, Enceladus or even in the 
clouds of Jupiter and Saturn, or when we, hopefully, 
begin harvesting data about life on diverse exoplanets, the 
validation or modification of my definition will still not 
lead to a truly universal definition.  
    This is due to the fact that all definitions so far, my 
own included, are inductive; that is, a conclusion from the 
specific to the general. While the conclusion of inductive 
reasoning may be probable, based upon the available 
evidence, it cannot be logically certain. Only when all of 
the hypothetical life in the solar system is found can the 
phrase be modified to ‗LifeSolar system‘, and only after all 
life in the galaxy is found, can we proceed to the phrase 
‗LifeGalaxy‘. Even then, it will still be an inductive 
conclusion.  
    The phrase ‗LifeUniversal‗ will only be deductive, that is, 
a logical conclusion from the general to the specific, 
where the conclusion is necessarily true, when all life on 
all planets in all the galaxies of the universe is carefully 
examined.   
    Thus, even though the point is valid and it is limiting to 
generalize from a single example, or examples, it is 
restricted in this respect, and it is still without much 
relevancy regarding the formulation of a definition, since 
it is not immediately obvious how we will ever be able to 
obtain knowledge of all the possible life that exist in this 
vast universe.  
    Life on other planets may modify the definition of life, 
although I am inclined to think that life on the Earth is 
representative of life. Nevertheless, from a deductive 
point of view, we cannot simply criticize a definition just 
because we lack data points, and it is just important to 
keep this in mind.   
 
3.8. Summery considerations.  
 
If we choose to take all these pro and con points into 
consideration and relax the requirements, then the 
following second formulation can be put forward:   
 
LifeUniversal is an information-containing, self-sustaining 
physical dissipative system, capable of maintaining its 
localized level of organization at the expense of 
producing entropy in the environment; which has 
developed its numerous characteristics through 
pluripotential evolution.  
 
4. Summary  
 
Why attempt a definition of life? There are two reasons in 
my mind. The first one is that we, ourselves, individually 
and collectively, are life, and it seems strange that we 
cannot provide a definition of what we are. The second 
reason is that humankind is on the verge of becoming a 
space-faring species. Life on this blue planet may be only 
one in the grand cosmic tree of life. Our capability for 
searching or encountering life on other planets is steadily 
becoming a real possibility. To realize that search, we 
have to know what we are looking for, and that requires a 
definition.  
    The study of life has, understandably, taken place 
within a terrestrial perspective in biology. Evolutionary 
biology explains life very well, but we have steadily 
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become aware that life is intrinsically linked together 
with the very solar system it arises in, perhaps even with 
the very galaxy. Thus, a wider perspective is required, 
one that is addressed by astrobiology.  
    Life depends not only on local ecosystems. It depends 
on the very composition of the planet it is on, of the very 
location of the planet in the solar system, the habitable 
zone, and on the very star the planet orbits. Life itself is 
assembled of elements that originated in the cores of stars 
far away in time and space. Thus, there is a need and 
justification for astrobiology.  
    There are many definitions of it. Personally, I tend to 
define it as: ‗Astrobiology is evolutionary biology in a 
solar system context (or more ambitiously: Astrobiology 
is evolutionary biology in a galactic context)‘. 
Astrobiology will, in all likelihood, with time, be able to 
explain life even better in the cosmic perspective to 
which it belongs.  
    It can be discussed whether we still lack a general 
theory of how matter progressively gains the 
characteristics that are associated with objects that are 
designated as life, or whether we already have that 
overall and only need to do the right types of experiments 
to demonstrate how matter obtains the characteristics that 
are associated with so-called animate objects. However, 
regardless of that, we can come a long way in defining 
life by using a first principle approach.  
    A first principle, from which a demonstration begins, 
starts with the most essential facts and relations and can 
utilize physics, chemistry and biology very well without 
needing to be demonstrated from any other proposition or 
alluding to any theory. Thus, two definitions, one that is 
strict and one that is more relaxed, have been put forward 
on this foundation.  
    These definitions provide two operational ways in 
which we can search for potential life on other planets. 
First, a visiting observer on an exoplanet will see the 
attributes of life in the form of the diversity of species in 
ecosystems and the competition and synergism of 
species, which are all observations that lead to the fact 
that evolution is taking place.  
    Second, the above-listed attributes will not be seen by 
an observer positioned far outside the exoplanet. He will 
see life as the process of taking free energy from its 
surroundings and returning entropy, which affects the 
very atmosphere of the exoplanet. Thus, it is a well-
known fact that the chemical composition of the Earth‘s 
atmosphere is far from equilibrium, which is designated 
as ‗redox disequilibrium‘.  
    Lovelock emphasizes this, stating that ‗the entropy of 
living systems is low relative to that of their nonliving 
environments in that there will always exist an entropy 
gradient between the two‘, when he, along with a group 
of researchers, proposed a life detection system to look 
for life on Mars [Hitchcock and Lovelock, 1967]. The 
state of disequilibrium has, thus, been proposed as a 
biosignature, albeit not the only one, that can tell us 
whether there is life on exoplanets [Schwieterman et. al., 
2018]. This is due to the fact that the simultaneous and 
persistent existence of CH4 and O2 in the Earth‘s 
atmosphere, which should otherwise rapidly oxidize to 
CO2 and H2O, is an indication that life continually 
resupplies these gases.  
    However, the existence of an entropy reduction on a 
planet is not a sufficient indicator of life, but the absence 
of one is a strong indication that life is not present on a 
planet, since an entropy reduction is an essential 
characteristic of life.  
    The definitions put forward also provide other 
possibilities. Thus, it has been postulated that 
evolutionary definitions lead to a problem involving the 
observation of evolution, which is especially relevant for 
astrobiology, since it seems to imply a consequence of 
how long we must wait to record the effects of natural 
selection on exoplanets and under what conditions [Luisi, 
1998].  
    However, it is indeed possible to observe the process 
of natural selection happening relatively fast due to the 
fact that the rate of change in a population is related to 
the duration of an organism‘s life cycle [Carroll et al. 
2007]. Thus, many organisms can experience phenotypic 
evolution in only a few generations, and noticeable 
differentiation among populations within species can take 
place within observable time frames.  
    Nevertheless, the definitions put forward here have the 
advantage in terms of time frames in that they do not 
require that we look forward but that we in the present 
either can see an entropy reduction in a planet‘s 
atmosphere or that we can see evidence of evolution in 
the present or in the past on the planet. For example, it is 
possible that life once existed on Mars but disappeared 
due to the planet‘s transformation into a hostile 
environment for life [McKay and Stoker, 1989]. 
However, if life once existed on the red planet, then 
evidence of it and its evolution will probably still be 
there.  
    Life arose relatively quickly after the Earth‘s 
formation, which may be an indication that life, with 
some certainty, will arise on planets in possession of the 
right conditions. Thus, if life is common in the universe, 
then there is the possibility that life elsewhere could be 
built differently than their terrestrial counterparts and that 
we may be too restricted when looking for extra-
terrestrial life [Schulze-Makuch and Irwin, 2006].  
    It is a reasonable point, and one could perhaps even 
argue that all that the laws of physics allow to arise, will 
arise. Thus, the real question is whether the laws of 
physics allow life on other planets to function in other 
ways than we know on the Earth. A plenitude of life not 
only in biological diversity, but in chemical construction.  
    Thus, we can perhaps expect life to exist elsewhere, 
with different genetic codes, more amino acids or amino 
acids with different chirality [Cleland and Copley, 2005]. 
It may be the case that water does not define life, but just 
happens to be an aspect of the Earth‘s environment. Thus, 
it is possible to conceive of solvents such as ammonia, 
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sulfuric acid or methane-ammonia mixtures [Pace, 2001]. 
It may also be possible for life to use arsenic in the place 
of phosphorus to build its DNA [Wolfe-Simon et al., 
2010]. Life on the Earth is based on a specific set of very 
complex chemical systems build on carbon. However, it 
might be possible for life forms to have a silicon-based 
system [Pace, 2001].  
    However, it has been argued that biochemistry 
elsewhere in the universe will turn out to be the same as 
that on the Earth, because some processes are more 
effective than others; carbon is better than silicon, and 
water is better than ammonia [Pace, 2001]. Thus, natural 
selection will ensure (assuming there is an initial 
diversity of molecules to select from) that life, in terms of 
biochemistry, evolves in the same way everywhere.  
    However, either way, even if extra-terrestrial life with 
such alien biochemistries exists, they are still easily 
encapsulated by the definitions put forward in this work, 
since these are independent of the abovementioned 
constituent molecules.  
    The discovery of evolution represents a tremendous 
enrichment of humankind‘s understanding of itself and its 
place in nature, which is equal to the discovery of the 
solar systems place in the universe. However, it took 
humankind thousands of years to finally reach that 
insight, which is an insight that is yet relatively easy to 
comprehend when first encountered. Thus, it is perhaps 
not so strange that an adequate definition of life is still in 
the making; after all, barely any time has elapsed after 
these profound advancements.  
    Perhaps life is a question with a billion answers. Or 
perhaps the opposite is true: life is the single answer to a 
billion questions. Time will tell.  
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